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COGNITIVE REGENERATION AND THE NOETIC EFFECTS OF SIN:  
WHY THEOLOGY AND COGNITIVE SCIENCE MAY NOT BE COMPATIBLE 
 
Why do so many people believe in God or gods?1 Christian theologians have traditionally 
understood true faith as God’s supernatural gift. According to cognitive science of religion 
(CSR), however, the roots of all kinds of supernatural belief lie in the evolved cognitive biases 
and mechanisms of the human mind. These include our sensitivity to minimally 
counterintuitive ideas,2 to cues of agency,3 the tendency to see design and purpose in the 
natural world4 as well as in our life events.5 At first blush, such naturalistic theories seem to 
explain away supernatural accounts that take God to be the origin of god-belief. However, 
theologians have traditionally argued that God endowed humans with natural faculties 
sensitive to perceiving God. Therefore, scientific and theological accounts of god-belief may 
both be true. The question is, are they compatible? 
 
Psychologist Justin Barrett and philosopher Kelly James Clark have famously argued that god-
belief can be rational even if it is generated by automatic cognitive biases and mechanisms.6 
Also, they view the results of CSR as largely compatible with a theological understanding of 
the origins of god-belief. Cognitive science may support the existence of something akin to 
sensus divinitatis or a “god-faculty” that gives humans a direct, basic awareness of the 
existence of God or gods. Calvin’s concept of sensus divinitatis has been reintroduced into 
contemporary debates over religious epistemology by Alvin Plantinga.7 A central claim in 
Plantinga’s Reformed epistemology is that belief in God is typically not born out of reflective 
consideration of arguments and evidence for God. Rather, sensus divinitatis simply gives rise 
to belief when activated by a beautiful landscape, a survival of a life-threatening accident, or 
by other existentially moving situations. As Clark and Barrett point out, this coheres well with 
how cognitive scientists understand the formation of god-beliefs. Similarly to Plantinga, they 
argue that this kind of direct belief-forming process can be fully rational. Thus, they find 
cognitive science to be compatible with a Plantingian view of rationality in general and CSR 
compatible with the rationality of god-belief in particular.  They also see “remarkable points 
of convergence” as well as “a few points of divergence” between CSR and Reformed 
epistemology.8 
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Clark and Barrett also make an intriguing theological suggestion: God may have guided the 
evolutionary process in order to give rise to the god-faculty.9 In other words, perhaps the 
cognitive biases and mechanisms unearthed by CSR are part of God’s providential plan for 
humanity. This theological reading of CSR is the focus of this article. I will begin by presenting 
two problems previously mentioned in the literature. First, it seems that CSR biases and 
mechanisms make humans more likely to believe in false deities than in the God of Abrahamic 
monotheism. Second, people display an in-group/out-group bias, which seems to be the root 
cause of moral evil and yet just as “natural” as our susceptibility to god-belief. I will call these 
idolatry bias and tribalism bias, respectively. Since God is said to hate idolatry and moral evil, 
one wonders why God would give rise to human minds with such biases. Next, I will consider 
a “Plantingian” response that refers to the noetic effects of sin and discuss the possibility of 
making such a response compatible with evolutionary science. However, I will argue that the 
sin response makes theological sense only if it is joined with the claim that God restores the 
minds and hearts of believers. According to Plantinga, regeneration has both cognitive (one’s 
view of God becomes increasingly clear and correct) and affective (one grows in love toward 
God and other people) aspects. Thus, we would expect believers to be gradually healing from 
their idolatrous and tribalistic biases. I will then consider reasons to question whether 
regeneration is actually taking place. CSR suggests that Christians entertain theologically 
incorrect views of God. Also, evidence from social psychology indicates that religiosity is often 




I. THE NATURALNESS OF IDOLATRY AND TRIBALISM 
 
Several CSR scholars have argued that belief in supernatural agents is “cognitively natural”.10 
In other words, god-beliefs are widespread because they are reinforced by normally 
developing, pan-human cognitive biases and mechanisms. This idea resonates with traditional 
theological claims regarding general revelation. According to the Catechism of the Catholic 
Church, for example, man is by nature a “religious being” whose “faculties make him capable 
of coming to a knowledge of the existence of a personal God”.11 From a theological point of 
view, the god-faculty may be seen as a capacity designed by God for receiving the input from 
God’s general revelation. As Clark and Barrett suggest, perhaps God has guided the cognitive 
evolution in close detail in order to bring about these highly specialized features of human 
cognition. 
 
CSR scholars typically do not think, however, that belief in one God as such is cognitively 
natural. As Helen De Cruz and Johan De Smedt point out, the earliest historical evidence of 
religion – cave paintings and sculptures dating back about 30,000 years – suggests that “the 
earliest religious concepts in human prehistory were not at all like the Abrahamic 
monotheistic God, but rather, consisted of a rich supernatural world that included animals, 
humans and intermediate forms”.12 “Big Gods” seem to appear rather late in the history of 
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religions.13 Since the CSR mechanisms are usually taken to be at least as old as the earliest 
forms of religion, it seems that they have predominantly disposed humans to beliefs about 
several, finite supernatural agents.  
 
Now, what Clark and Barrett mean by a “god-faculty” is simply that “the ordinary 
arrangement and function of cognitive architecture in human minds often produces 
nonreflective, unreasoned belief in gods”.14 While it may not produce belief in “Yahweh and 
Yahweh alone”, the faculty could make “humans aware of the broad divine/moral dimension 
of reality”.15 Unlike Plantinga, then, they do not argue for a mechanism that produces only or 
mainly monotheistic belief in the one true God. But if “God chose this sort of mind for us”, 
Barrett asks, 
 
why do the documented conceptual biases only encourage belief in superhuman agents generally and not 
one true, accurate God concept? Further, if God created humanity to enjoy a loving relationship with Him, 
why not hard-wire into our brains a fully formed belief in God?16 
 
More importantly, as Clark notes, the god-faculty also produces beliefs in “elves, dwarves, 
goblins, tree spirits, and witches”.17 From a Christian viewpoint this means that we are more 
prone to idolatry than to belief in the one true God. The Bible and the Christian tradition 
clearly proscribe all types of idolatry and command undivided devotion to the God of Israel 
(Ex. 20:2; Matt. 22:37–38; Acts 17:29–30; 1. Cor. 10:19–22). If the purpose of the god-faculty 
would be to produce awareness of this God, why has it mostly produced idolatrous beliefs?  
 
Now consider the second theological worry. John Teehan has presented what he calls a 
cognitive problem of evil.18 Human minds sculpted by natural selection are not only prone to 
god-belief but also prone to moral evil. Our natural, intuitive moral psychology is the root 
cause of much moral evil in the world, of xenophobia, ethnocentricism, racism and such. 
Teehan concentrates on one proximate mechanism influencing moral behavior: empathy. 
Empathy is “the capacity to recognize and respond to, on both a cognitive and emotional level, 
the emotional state of another individual”.19 The evidence for the crucial role of empathy 
comes, for example, from studies of psychopaths whose empathy-generating brain areas are 
damaged. Teehan, however, is interested in healthy brains, not damaged ones. He refers to 
experiments that point to a decreased sensitivity to feeling empathy toward people who do 
not belong to our in-group. People carefully differentiate between those in their in-group 
(family, tribe, class, nation, fan club) and those belonging to some out-group. In one study, the 
brains of Chinese and Caucasian participants were monitored while they watched videos of 
Chinese and Caucasian people in pain.20 The empathy levels differed significantly depending 
on whether the person on the video was of their own ethnicity or not. Significant differences 
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in empathic response can also be elicited by religious and political partisanship, even by 
football.21 Moreover, members of extreme out-groups –such as drug addicts or homeless 
people – are often dehumanized. Pictures of such persons elicit a disgust response, the kind 
that usually arises as a reaction to disgusting objects.22 While we may question the extent to 
which moral evil can be explained by reference to such a tribalism bias, Teehan argues that “it 
is the psychological basis of prejudice, discrimination, and dehumanization—and all the 
injustice, harm, and violence that follow”.23 
 
How is this related to CSR and to the claim about the divine guidance of cognitive evolution? 
According to cognitive science, our minds process information on two levels called intuition 
and reflection (or analytical thinking), also known as System 1 and System 2.24 System 1 
refers to the quick and automatic processes that mostly operate outside of our conscious 
control and that evolution has designed for an efficient response.  System 2 is needed for 
conscious, reflective, and effortful thinking. The cognitive naturalness of god-beliefs basically 
means that they are reinforced by System 1. As Teehan notes, the cognitive mechanisms for 
empathy also function as a part of System 1. Just as natural selection has made our minds 
sensitive to ideas of supernatural agency, it also fosters animosity toward out-groups. While 
education (where System 2 is constantly employed) and other forms of culture can help 
suppress intuitive thinking, Teehan argues that the dispositions toward religious belief and 
tribalism both follow from the brain working as it was designed to work by evolution.  The 
cognitive biases and mechanisms that make up System 1 are parts of a basic, universal 
blueprint of the human mind. If God carefully guided the cognitive evolution in order to give 
rise to the highly specialized tools of the god-faculty, it would seem that God is also causally 
responsible for our deviated moral intuitions. But surely, Teehan argues, a morally perfect 
God would not want to create people with a strong tendency toward moral evil. In his view, 
whether or not a theological account of the evolution of god-belief can be made compatible 
with CSR, it cannot be made consistent with the findings of moral psychology. 
  
 
II. A RESPONSE: THE NOETIC EFFECTS OF SIN 
 
Let us consider a response to these worries. The traditional Christian view of history can be 
divided into three main stages:  
 
(1) God’s original, good, well-designed creation. 
 
(2) Sin corrupting the original creation. 
 
(3) God overcoming sin and restoring the original creation. 
 
The questions we dealt with in the previous section seem to concern stage (1). A proper 
theological response, however, must take stage (2) also into account. According to traditional 
Christian understanding, sin is a disease that affects our head and our heart, our cognition and 
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our affections. The idea of the noetic effects of sin is integral to Reformed theology as well as 
Plantinga’s Reformed epistemology. In what follows, I will consider the problems outlined 
above in light of Plantinga’s claims regarding sin and regeneration. In discussing the noetic 
effects of sin, Plantinga differentiates between sin’s cognitive and affective consequences. 
Because of the cognitive consequences, sensus divinitatis has become diseased and 
dysfunctional. 
 
The most serious noetic effects of sin have to do with our knowledge of God. Were it not for sin and its 
effects, God’s presence and glory would be as obvious and uncontroversial to us all as the presence of 
other minds, physical objects, and the past. (…) Our original knowledge of God and his glory is muffled and 
impaired; it has been replaced (by virtue of sin) by stupidity, dullness, blindness, inability to perceive God 
or to perceive him in his handiwork. Our knowledge of his character and his love toward us can be 
smothered: it can even be transformed into a resentful thought that God is to be feared and mistrusted; we 
may see him as indifferent or even malignant.25 
 
Cognitive consequences of sin, then, include unbelief and false ideas about the nature of God. 
Even some theologians tend to think of God as “an impersonal abstract object (‘the ground of 
being’) rather than as a living person who judges me” or as “an indulgent grandparent who 
smiles at the childish peccadilloes of her grandchildren” rather than “as a holy God who hates 
sin”.26 Whereas Plantinga focuses on views prevalent in the academy, he would surely agree 
with Calvin that polytheism and animism likewise result from the corruption of sensus 
divinitatis (see Helm 1998: 95).27 Sin also has affective consequences. “Instead of loving God 
above all and my neighbor as myself”, Plantinga writes, “I am inclined to love myself above all 
and, indeed, to hate God and my neighbor”.28 One affective consequence is prejudice towards 
people outside of one’s in-group. 
 
Because of hatred or distaste for some group of human beings, I may think them inferior, of less worth 
than I myself and my more accomplished friends. Because of hostility and resentment, I may misestimate 
or entirely misunderstand someone else’s attitude toward me, suspecting them of trying to do me in, 
when in fact there is nothing to the suggestion.29 
 
The concept of the noetic effects of sin, then, could provide a viable theological response to 
the worries raised by the naturalness of idolatry and tribalism. Both biases are the result of 
sin (stage 2), not part of God’s original design (stage 1). Such a response, however, is itself at 
odds with evolutionary science, for it seems to assume a historical Fall into sin. According to 
Helen De Cruz and Johan De Smedt, science casts doubt particularly on two claims in the 
traditional Augustinian account of the Fall: (a) that the first humans were created 
epistemically and morally perfect, and that (b) by committing the first sin they introduced 
death and corruption (including epistemic and moral corruption) into the world.30 While 
Plantinga avoids taking a stand on the historicity of Adam and Eve, he does say that humans 
have fallen from “a pristine state”.31 Such a pristine state seems improbable in terms of 
idolatry and tribalism. As De Cruz and De Smedt argue, the further down the history of our 
species we gaze, the more gods and the more violence we find. The earliest forms of religion 
makes it very unlikely that once upon a time people had a correct view of God until they fell 
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into shamanism and polytheism.  Also, for all we know, the hominids that preceded us were 
far more violent than modern humans; our primate cousins such as chimpanzees certainly 
are.32 As Teehan writes, we have “no evidence of any period in human history in which we 
find an inclusive love for the stranger that (a) breaks with a previous state of in-group bias 
common to other mammals and (b) then gives way again to rampant in-group bias, ostensibly 
resulting from original sin”.33 An evolutionary view of history, therefore, is not easily 
reconciled with the idea of the noetic effects of sin. Even if we dismissed most features of the 
story in Genesis as unhistorical, it seems some kinds of “before” and “after” are needed for the 
sin response to make sense. As a solution to this problem, De Cruz and De Smedt offer an 
“Irenaean” account of the Fall. 
 
According to Irenaeus, humanity did not begin in a state of perfection, but rather, in a not fully developed 
condition. The first humans were not morally perfect, but in a state of moral innocence (like nonhuman 
animals). Although Irenaeus also thought about the Fall in terms of a factual historical event, its historicity 
was not central to his notion of sin, nor did he regard it as an act that tainted subsequent humankind. 
Rather, he saw the Fall as a representation of the loss of this state of moral innocence (Jacobsen 2005). 
Under this view, it is possible to perceive sin not as the outcome of a single historical event, but as 
tendencies to be morally or cognitively off-track.34 
 
An Irenaean account, the authors suggest, allows us to reject a historical fall from perfection 
to corruption and to view the noetic effects of sin as the outcome of a gradual process. 
Cognitive evolution is viewed as analogous to the intellectual and moral development of a 
child where new capacities and abilities bring about new possibilities for right and wrong 
thinking and behavior. In this picture, then, stages (1) and (2) become more intertwined. 
 
De Cruz and De Smedt also argue that sensus divinitatis is not corrupted. Like Clark and 
Barrett, they suggest it is and always has been underspecified. Left to itself, the faculty might 
produce some sort of thin theistic belief in “one or more supernatural agents, who have 
intentions, desires and beliefs […] is omniscient […] and causally responsible for the design 
features of our universe […] and takes an interest in our morally relevant actions”.35 Perhaps, 
then, we should view the sensus divinitatis as not like a GPS but more like a medieval map that 
leads one roughly in the right direction. Nevertheless, the problem remains: why have so 
many humans worshipped deities such as forest spirits and fertility gods instead of opting for 
thin theism? De Cruz and De Smedt blame the cultural environment. They compare sensus 
divinitatis to the human language faculty. The ability to learn a language is cognitively natural, 
but the cultural environment determines which language children learn. Similarly, the 
environment determines which god-concept(s) children eventually adopt. Perhaps, as Calvin 
himself believed, Scripture and Holy Spirit are needed for people to arrive at the correct 
concept of God. But, De Cruz and De Smedt argue, such “supplementary sources” are not 
meant to fix the sensus divinitatis. After all, it is not broken. 
 
I do not find this response very promising. First, although Irenaeus might have softened the 
Fall, his account does not differ that much from Augustine’s.36 Irenaeus does seem to assume a 
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descent from a paradisiacal state that resulted in man losing the image of God. Of course, one 
may simply draw inspiration from his account and develop it further, but one would lose the 
support of tradition one hopes to gain from Irenaeus.  Second, explaining the historical 
prevalence of idolatry by reference to the cultural environment that feeds sensus divinitatis 
false ideas suggests that the cultural environment is itself corrupted. This raises the question 
of what corrupted it. We are still left without an explanation of what causes all this idolatry if 
it’s nothing anything God did or we did. Now, perhaps an Irenaean account could view the 
propensity to idolatry and tribalism as part of humanity’s childhood and point to God’s long-
term plan to eventually give rise to monotheism via cultural evolution. But such an account 
would have to view the propensity for idolatry and tribalism flowing out of God’s original 
design, which again is theologically problematic.37 
 
  
III. COGNITIVE REGENERATION AND THEOLOGICAL INCORRECTNESS 
 
Whether or not an Irenaean account can escape these criticisms, a response in reference to 
noetic effects of sin faces an additional theological worry related to stage (3). According to the 
Christian narrative, God is in the business of redeeming at least some human beings from 
their sinful state. Let us formulate the three stages in light of our topic and the Plantingian 
framework we have adopted. 
 
(1*) God has originally created humans (via guided evolution) with cognitive faculties 
that make them prone to believe in the one true God and affective faculties that make 
them prone to love God and their neighbors.38 
 
(2*) Sin has caused cognitive damage making people prone to idolatry (specifically, false 
ideas of divinity) and affective damage making people prone to moral evil (specifically, 
animosity and disregard for people outside of their in-group). 
 
(3*) The Holy Spirit brings about a cognitive and affective regeneration in believers 
through which they are gradually restored into rightly believing and loving creatures. 
 
In what follows, I will assume that the sin response would make little theological sense if it 
wasn’t joined with the idea of regeneration. Even those Christian thinkers who disagree with 
this Plantingian formulation of stage (1*) – as Clark and Barrett might – would have to 
respond to whether regeneration and sanctification ought to affect how believers think of God 
and treat other people. Plantinga describes stage (3*) as follows. 
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The believer enters a process whereby she is regenerated, transformed, made into a new and better 
person. We might say she acquires a new and better nature. This new and better nature is also a renewal, 
a restoration of the nature with which humankind was originally created. Sin damaged our nature; 
regeneration, the work of the Holy Spirit, is (among other things) a matter of setting right and repairing 
that damage.39 
 
Regeneration touches our cognition and our affections. Following Calvin, Plantinga states that 
faith is something both “revealed to our minds” and “sealed upon our hearts” through the 
Holy Spirit in so that we might see “God and his love, glory, beauty, and the like with much 
higher resolution”.40 What is more, “when the sources of affection function properly” we will 
“love God above all and our neighbor as ourselves”.41 Let us call these two aspects cognitive 
and affective regeneration, respectively. As a result of this process the believer has “the right 
beliefs, but also the right affections”.42 Since regeneration in something that is supposed to 
transform human nature, it makes sense to assume such as process would affect also System 1 
type of natural cognition. But are believers actually undergoing a process described by (3*)? If 
they were, we should be able to find empirical evidence for it. Specifically, there should be 
evidence that, in comparison with non-Christians, Christians have a more theologically 
accurate view of God and they are more loving toward others, including outsiders.  
 
As I will argue, it is easier to find evidence against these claims than for them. One line of 
argument against cognitive regeneration could run as follows. From a Christian theological 
perspective, Christian believers obviously have more accurate view of God than, say, Hindus 
or Animists. Nevertheless, just as other religious people, Christians seem to entertain false 
intuitions of God. CSR scholars call this tendency theological incorrectness.43 Theologians have 
traditionally emphasized God as totally other: God is unlike anything else we know of, wholly 
different from anything created. But theology is by nature analytical and reflective, the stuff of 
System 2. In everyday religion, we rely mostly on System 1. Therefore, believers 
unconsciously entertain highly anthropomorphic ideas of God at the same time as they 
confess to believe in the God of the theologians. 
 
Prehistorical people typically viewed gods as less than omniscient and as restricted by time 
and space. People of many other religions still do. Christians also display some tendency to 
think of God this way. For instance, in one experiment, adult Christian participants, when 
made to respond quickly, made many more theological mistakes in evaluating statements 
about God that were false theologically but true on intuition (e.g., “God has beliefs that are 
false”) compared with statements that were true or false both theologically and intuitively.44 
The study suggests that the cognitive tendency to view God as less than omniscient is very 
persistent, even though upon inquiry believers confess that God knows everything. Christians 
also say they believe God is omnipresent. In practice, however, they tend to think of God as 
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restricted by time and space.45 In some evangelical churches, for example, the Holy Spirit is 
invited to come and dwell in the midst of the congregation as if the Spirit wasn’t there 
already.46 The argument could continue by pointing out that such natural proneness to 
anthropomorphism does not only lead us to view God as human-like, but also to view natural 
objects and places (trees, rocks, lakes) as having person-like agency.47 Theologically speaking, 
anthropomorphism is not only the root of animism but also idolatry. If Christians were really 
undergoing a cognitive regeneration, would we not expect the Holy Spirit to weed out 
proneness toward anthropomorphism more extensively? 
 
Such an argument, however, may not get very far. While cognitive regeneration does imply 
increasing awareness regarding certain divine attributes (Plantinga emphasizes insight into 
God’s moral attributes), this need not mean that the Holy Spirit would obliterate all false 
intuitions of divinity immediately. More importantly, there is necessarily nothing wrong about 
thinking of God in human-like terms. In fact, Plantinga’s own view of God is rather 
anthropomorphic! Plantinga is often seen as a representative of theistic personalism which 
views God as a person not totally unlike us. However, the empirical argument against 
cognitive regeneration might work if we took classical theism as the correct view of God. Given 
the truth of classical theism, what CSR would show is not that we are “born believers” but 
rather “born idolaters”.48 The supernatural agents favored by our cognitive systems are 
human-like beings located in the natural world. They cause events and can be sometimes 
detected. The God of classical theism, however, is not located in time and place. God is pure 
act and the ultimate cause behind absolutely every event. God is not even a person. The 
classical God becomes even more counterintuitive if we consider attributes such as simplicity, 
immutability, and impassibility. For instance, divine immutability means nothing outside of 
God can have any effect on him, while almost every Christian thinks prayer can move God to 
do something he might not have done otherwise. Although classical theism has been the 
dominant view in the history of theology, few believers think of God in these terms. From this 
point of view, then, one could perhaps formulate a decent argument against cognitive 
regeneration – which could make the noetic effects of sin a less feasible explanation for the 
cognitive naturalness of idolatry. 
 
 
IV. AFFECTIVE REGENERATION AND PREJUDICE 
 
As we saw, Plantinga understands faith is something “revealed to our minds” and “sealed 
upon our hearts”. “This sealing”, he explains, “consists in the having of the right sorts of 
affections; in essence, it consists in loving God above all and one’s neighbor as oneself”.49 Let us 
call the underlying process affective regeneration. Again, if such a process were really taking 
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place, we would expect believers’ attitudes and behavior toward outsiders to be more 
inclusive and loving compared to those of non-Christians. 
 
Teehan’s account of the tribalism bias comes close to what social psychologists call prejudice. 
Prejudice may defined as “the holding of derogatory social attitudes or cognitive beliefs, the 
expression of negative affect, or the display of hostile or discriminatory behavior towards 
members of a group on account of their membership of that group”.50 Studies on the 
relationship between religion and prejudice seem to provide relevant evidence regarding 
affective regeneration. The evidence, however, is mixed. One the one hand, social psychologist 
C. Daniel Batson has argued for decades that the existing research clearly shows that “the 
more religious an individual is, the more intolerant he or she is likely to be”.51 In the United 
States, where the majority of the studies on religion and prejudice has been conducted, white 
middle-class Christians have often been found to be prejudiced toward other ethnic groups 
(Jews and blacks), sexual minorities (gay men and lesbian women), and certain political 
groups (Communists).52 On the other hand, after a comprehensive overview of the relevant 
studies, other leading scholars conclude, that “religion is, in general, negatively associated 
with prejudice”.53 
 
In trying to reconcile these statements, we need to differentiate between various religious 
orientations. For instance, if you take your religion seriously and consider it as an end in itself, 
you are likely to have an intrinsic orientation towards religion.54 You agree with claims such 
as “I try hard to carry my religion over into all my other dealings in life”. However, if you see 
religion as a means to other ends, such as achieving social status or security, you likely have 
an extrinsic orientation. A person scoring high on the intrinsic scale is likely to score low on 
the extrinsic scale (and vice versa). A third type of orientation is called quest religion. If this is 
your orientation, you are likely to be open to doubts and to changing your religious views, you 
accept the complexity of existential questions and resist clear-cut answers.55 If you score low 
on the quest scale, chances are you will score high on the religious fundamentalism scale. 
Many versions of this scale include claims such as these: 
 
 God has given humanity a complete, unfailing guide to happiness and salvation, which 
must be totally followed. 
 
 The basic cause of evil in this world is Satan, who is still constantly and ferociously 
fighting against God. 
 
 It is more important to be a good person than to believe in God and the right religion. 
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 When you get right down to it, there are basically only two kinds of people in the 
world: the Righteous, who will be rewarded by God, and the rest, who will not. 
 
 Whenever science and sacred scripture conflict, science is probably right.56 
 
Now, not all types of religious people are necessarily true believers, that is, ones we would 
expect to be undergoing regeneration. While most intrinsics and fundamentalists should 
probably be counted as real believers, extrinsics are perhaps the most likely to be discarded 
as “nominal” Christians. How about questers? The answer probably depends on one’s 
theological assumptions. 
 
Studies typically bring out only correlations between religion and prejudice. That is, they 
don’t show whether or not religion causes prejudice. This doesn’t mean they are unimportant, 
however. If there was a strong relationship between prejudice and those religious 
orientations we view as characteristic of true believers, this would run counter Plantinga’s 
case for affective regeneration. Extrinsic religion is positively correlated with several types of 
prejudice (Batson 1993: 304), while several studies suggest that quest orientation is 
negatively linked to prejudice.57 That is, questers seem to be more tolerant of different kinds 
of people than most. However, even questers seem to be intolerant of religious 
fundamentalists.58 The relationship between prejudice and intrinsic religion is more complex. 
In his meta-analysis, Whitley points out that two independent literature reviews that show 
that 70 percent of the studies on the relationship of intrinsic religiosity and prejudice found 
positive correlations, whereas only 22 percent found negative correlations (in the remaining 
eight percent, the results were not statistically significant).59 Intrinsics are not prone to all 
kinds of prejudice, however. For example, Whitley notes that five out of seven religiosity 
measures (including the intrinsic orientation) had some relationship with positive attitudes 
toward other ethnicities.60 Batson, however, rejects results indicating positive attitudes. He 
argues that since most churches condemn racism and the survey questions are rather 
transparent (almost as if asking “are you a racist bigot?”), there is a self-representational bias 
in play.61 That is, intrinsics are not as inclusive of other ethnicities as they claim to be. 
 
The relationship between intrinsic religion and prejudice toward homosexuals is also not 
clear-cut. In Whitley’s meta-analysis, five out of seven measures of religiosity (including the 
intrinsic orientation) were related to more negative attitudes toward lesbians and gay men. 
However, it has been objected that these studies make no difference between attitudes 
toward “the sin” and “the sinner”, that is, homosexual behavior and homosexual persons. 
Batson and his team tested whether this distinction holds water.62 In their study, participating 
students were given a few pieces of information about a fellow student named Jerry or Jenny 
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who was in need of financial help. Those scoring high on the intrinsic scale were less willing 
to help Jerry/Jenny if s/he was said to be gay. It did not make much difference whether 
Jerry/Jenny needed the money to attend a gay parade or to visit his/her grandparents. 
According to Batson, “there seemed to be rejection of the gay person, not just of helping in a 
way that would promote a gay lifestyle”.63 Nevertheless, a study by another team found 
evidence showing that “intrinsics appear to be relatively accepting of homosexual people, but 
not of homosexual behavior”.64 
 
Religious fundamentalism, however, is clearly and consistently linked with many types of 
prejudice. In a survey of sixteen papers (with 25 samples) from 1990 to 2003, 
fundamentalism was found to be linked with negative attitudes toward gay/lesbian persons, 
women, communists, and religious outgroups, as well as with a personality trait called right-
wing authoritarianism.65 Results were similar in every study (39/39 findings in total). Only 
the relationship with racial/ethnic prejudice was less clear. Importantly, among self-
professing Christians, religious fundamentalism is not a marginal phenomenon as an 
orientation defined by social psychology. Belief in the Bible as the inerrant word of God and in 
a cosmic battle between the forces of good and evil are common ingredients of the 
conservative Christian worldview. The majority of evangelicals, for instance, score very highly 
on the religious fundamentalism scale.66 While most evangelicals may not count as religious 
fundamentalists, many lean to that direction. This suggests that many Christians with 
traditional religious views are at least somewhat prejudiced toward several out-groups. 
 
Atheists present yet another out-group for all religious groups. Prejudice against atheists 
seems to be global phenomenon.67 Ara Norenzayan argues that it follows naturally from the 
way religion functions.68 Historically, a shared belief in a “Big God” who monitors people’s 
moral behavior has enforced trust and cooperation among people in large groups. Large-scale 
cooperation is threatened by free-riders, that is, individuals who reap the benefits of 
cooperation but do not contribute themselves (if they can get away with it). Religion arose to 
solve this problem. Once everyone believed that they are being watched by a heavenly police 
who will punish cheating, and that others believe this as well, people were able to curb their 
selfish impulses and to trust each other. Atheists, who do not believe they are accountable to 
God for their actions, came to be viewed as potential free-riders. For this reason, religious 
people feel atheists cannot be trusted. 
 
Norenzayan and colleagues tested this hypothesis by telling participants a story of a man who 
cheats and steals when he thinks he can get away with it (an archetypal free-rider).69 They 
were then asked whether they thought it more probable that the man in question was a 
teacher or a teacher and something else (either a Christian, a Muslim, a rapist, or an atheist). 
Such conjugation fallacy tests are designed to reveal people’s tendency to view some type of 
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behavior as representative of certain types of persons. Only a few participants thought that 
cheating and stealing was the kind of behavior one could expect from Christians or Muslims. 
However, many saw it as probable that the cheating or stealing man was both a teacher and an 
atheist. In fact, fewer thought that the man was both a teacher and a rapist. The teacher-and-
atheist option was especially prevalent among participants who expressed a strong belief in 
God (most of whom were Christians). 
 
The results in this section may seem somewhat inconclusive. It is hard to say with certainty 
whether Christians in general are more or less prejudiced toward members of out-groups. It 
should be also noted that a weak positive link between religion and helping behavior exists, 
which might indicate something about how Christians treat others.70 However, we have seen 
good evidence that many traditional Christians display prejudice toward at least homosexuals 
and atheists. This may be enough to cause worries regarding the reality of affective 
regeneration according to which Christians should be more loving than others. According to 
Plantinga, the affective consequences of sin include hatred and distaste “for some group of 
human beings”. It is hard to deny there are lots of believers who display such hatred and 




V. A FEW OBJECTIONS 
 
Finally, let us consider just a few possible objections to the claim that studies on religion and 
prejudice challenge the truth of affective generation. First, while prejudice certainly might not 
be very virtuous, is it a sin? Is it something we should expect Holy Spirit to weed out from the 
hearts of believers? It does seem that prejudice runs counter to many teachings of the New 
Testament. Jesus stressed loving those who are difficult to love, even our enemies (Matt. 5:44). 
The parable of the Good Samaritan indicates that neighborly love is supremely displayed in 
helping and serving an out-group member (Luke 10:25-37). Paul likewise calls Christians to 
bless their enemies (1. Cor. 4:12) and to do good to them (Rom. 12:20-21). When we think of 
the many ugly forms of prejudice Christians have historically displayed towards outsiders, it 
does seem that religious prejudice is often deeply sinful. 
 
Second, although Plantinga writes as if cognitive and affective regeneration is something 
happening here and now, most churches teach that no Christian will be perfect in this life. 
Nevertheless, they also teach that becoming a believer involves a transformation in one’s 
character and behavior. The New Testament indicates that while believers do struggle with 
sin (1. John 1:8, 2:1), the Holy Spirit enables them to overcome habitual sin (Rom. 8:1–17; 1. 
John 3:6; 1. Pet. 4:4.). C. S. Lewis was certainly right in pointing out that we cannot expect 
every single believer to be more virtuous than every non-believer, since some converts may 
begin their moral growth from the bottom.71 However, if affective regeneration were really 
taking place, should we not expect believers to be little better at loving their neighbors? 
 
Third, a variety of objections could be formulated on the basis of the cultural context of the 
United States where most of the studies reviewed above have been conducted. Might 
American Christians be less prejudiced toward outsiders if it wasn’t for the culture wars, the 
two-party system, the theologically dubious televangelists, and so on? Perhaps so. However, it 
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would seem strange if the outcomes of regeneration were so dependent on the cultural 
context. Besides, similar relationships between religion and prejudice have been found in 
Europe. For instance, religious fundamentalism seems to have a similar relationship to 






Clark and Barrett have suggested that God may have guided evolution so as to give rise to a 
god-faculty akin to (but not as specified as) sensus divinitatis. From a theological viewpoint, it 
makes sense to think God has done this in order to draw people to himself. The prevalence of 
idolatry and moral evil in the history of humanity challenge this claim. While a Plantingian 
response referring to the cognitive and affective consequences of sin offer a theological 
explanation of the existence of such biases, it is itself hard to reconcile with evolutionary 
science. Importantly, such a response makes sense only in light of cognitive and affective 
regeneration. Studies on theological incorrectness and prejudice present reasons to doubt 
whether Christian believers are actually undergoing such a process. Even if these studies do 
not serve as conclusive evidence against regeneration, they contribute to making the sin 
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